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Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals from an order overruling
a motion for a new trial. Held: Judgment reversed. The evidence clearly
showed that plaintiff had assumed the risk. Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Martin, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 14, 1930, 170 N. E. 554.
A pick is a "simple tool," and the master owes no duty to the servant
to inspect and know the condition of such tool; if the servant actually
knows the defects in such tool, or if the defects are palpable so that lie
should know of them, and he uses or continues to use such tool, he assumes
the risk of such use. Jenney Electric Light, etc., Co. v. Murphy, 115 Ind.
566; Meador v. Lake Shore, etc., Co. 138 Ind. 290; American Carbon Co. v.
Jackson, 24 Ind. 390; Vandalia Ry. Co. v. Adams, 43 Ind. App. 664; Beard
v. Goulding, 55 Ind. App. 398; Standard Oil Co. v. Helmick, 148 Ind. 457;
Crum v. North Vernon Pump Co., 34 Ind. App. 253; McFarlan Carriage
Co. v. Potter, 153 Ind. 107; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry Co. v. Beale, 42
Ind. App. 588; Guedelhoder v. Ernsting, 23 Ind. App. 188.
The reason for the rule is that, in the case of simple, ordinary tools
which are known by the servant to be defective and which require no
special care or skill in their operation, the master can hardly be said to
have superior knowledge of the dangerous qualities of the tool; in such ease,
an injury occurring from the use of such tool is not the proximate result
of the master's negligence, but is the result of the assumption of risk by
the servant. Meador v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co., supra.
This rule applies unless the master expressly or impliedly promises to
remedy the defect. But the mere fact that the servant complains to the
master of the defect is not enough to raise such a promise on the part of
the master; the promise of the master must be such as induces the servant
to continue in the master's employ. Indianapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
Watson, 114 Ind. 27; Hath v. May, 10 N. E. (Mass.) 807; Pennsy. Ry. Co.
v. Lynch, 90 Ill. 333; Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Kemper, 147 Ind. 561.
The rules announced in the principal case are undoubtedly the weight of
Indiana authority, and under the view which the court took of the facts
(which seems reasonable) the case is rightly decided.
R.C. H.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AUTHORITY TO INDORSE INSTRUMENT-The trial
court made the following finding of facts:
"That on May 15, 1924, appellant issued to appellee its certificate of
deposit in the sum of $2,318.38, which said certificate was as follows
(H I): 'payable to the order of himself in current funds on the return
of this certificate properly endorsed.'" That on September 23, 1924, appellant in regular course of business received from Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Ill., said certificate, which bore on the back thereof the following
indorsement, to wit:
"Thomas Weiner
"ALEX COPELAND
"Farmers Bank & Trust Company, Fort Collins, Colorado
"Broadway National Bank, Denver, Colorado
"Northern Trust Company of Chicago, Ills.
"Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Ill.
"That on said date appellant paid to Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
$2,318.38; that prior to September 25, 1924, appellee placed said certificate
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in the possession of one Alex Copeland, who was then interested with appellee in some oil deals and properties in the state of Wyoming, without
indorsing the same; that prior to this time Copeland had notified appellee
that he (Copeland) would have to put up a cash bond on some oil deals in
which they were interested, pursuant to which request appellee sent Copeland the certificate as above stated; that appellee never recovered possession of said certificate after so placing the same in the possession of
Copeland; that, at the time said certificate was paid by appellant, the name
'Thomas Weiner' appeared on the back thereof as an indorsement, but
appellee did not write or indorse said name 'Thomas Weiner' on the back of
said certificate, and said name was not written or placed on the back of
said certificate by his direction or consent, and he had no knowledge whatever that the name 'Thomas Weiner' was placed thereon until after it was
paid by appellant, and said indorsement . . . . was not genuine and
was and is a forgery; (Italics ours) that Copeland was not the agent of
appellee and was not authorized or empowered to indorse said certificate for
and in behalf of appellee and to collect the proceeds thereof . ..
The trial court stated as conclusions of law upon the above facts that
the law was with appellee and that he recover. On appeal the Appellate
Court (Nichols, J.), reversed this finding of law. Exchange Bank of
Warren v. Weiner, 170 N. E. 788.
As we understand the opinion, the Appellate Court considers three
grounds for its decision: 1. That although generally a bank is liable to its
depositor upon payment of a forged indorsement, if this forgery was due
to the negligence of the depositor, then the innocent bank should not be
held liable. 2. Estoppel of plaintiff, in that he having placed the certificate in the hands of Copeland for his use, he could not charge the loss to
defendant, since he himself, through his confidence in Copeland, was originally responsible for the loss sustained. 3. That, where the business in
hand is of such a nature as to require the agent to indorse commercial
paper for the principal, or where such power is reasonably necessary to
effectuate the main object of the business in hand, then such agent will be
presumed to have the power to do so, and to that end, and for that purpose,
he is the agent of his principal so to indorse the paper.
It is submitted that upon the facts in the case the decision should not
rest upon the first two grounds, i. e., (1) negligence, and (2) estoppel.
The cases pronouncing the rule as to negligence are usually such situations
as where the depositor gives an unsigned check, or a check signed but not
filled out, to the wrongdoer, without any understanding that it is to be
filled out. See Note, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529. The case of Snodgrass v.
Sweetzer, 15 Ind. App. 682, relied on by the court for this point, was such
a case. Compare, however, Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Nye, 37 App. 464,
which might seem to exclude such acts from the category of negligence. It
could hardly be said that the appellee was negligent in the present transaction to such an extent as was apparent in the Snodgrass case, supra.
Neither was there a proper case of estoppel made out in the facts
here. In those cases where estoppel is applied, the depositor has either
had a course of dealing, known to the bank, which induced it to rely upon
the agent's apparent authority (Snodgrass v. Sweetzer, supra) or the
depositor has accepted money so acquired on different occasions without
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complaint. In all these cases, there has been a reliance by the bank upon
some course of dealing of the depositor. In the present case, no such facts
were found. It is not shown that the appellant bank knew anything about
appellee, or his partner or agent, or their business.
Upon the third ground stated above, however, the decision can be easily
supported. It could have gone on this ground alone, i. e., that inasmuch*
as there was an implied authority in Copeland, there was no forgery;
therefore the bank rightfully honored the indorsement. There is abundant
authority upon this subject. It seems that there is a presumption against
any implied authority in the agent to indorse paper for the principal,
especially where such agent is merely one to buy and sell, or to conduct the
principal's business generally; Smith v. Gibson, 6 Blackf. 369. And some
of the older cases state that such authority must be express, and cannot
be implied. However, the true rule seems to be that wherever such authority is indispensible to the execution of the particular purpose of the principal, it will be implied. See Note 71, 31 Cyc. 1382; Meecham, Agency,
2d Ed. Vol. I, Par. 971. It must be admitted that such authority is implied
only as an exception to the general rule; but the facts in this case seem to
come well within the exception. On this point in general, see Meecham,
supra, Par. 961-978.
As an incidental point, but essential to the court's decision upon the
substantive law of the case, it was necessary to dispose of the lower court's
finding of fact to the effect that "said indorsement was and is a forgery"
and "that Copeland was not the agent of appellee and was not authorized
...
. to indorse said certificate," etc. The Appellate Court considered
this a finding of ultimate facts, inconsistent with the primary findings set
out; that in such a case the inconsistent ultimate finding would be disregarded. The cases of Highway Iron Products Co. v. Phillips, 169 N. E.
878, and Smith v. Wells Co., 148 App. 333, cited in the opinion, appear,
upon examination, to support the court in this phase of its decision.
C. W. W.
SEARcH-TREsPAss-IPLiD LICENSE TO ENTER AS A DEFENSE-Officers
with a search warrant ascended an open stairway from the street to the
defendant's door. One of the officers knocked on the door and asked for
a drink of whisky. The door was voluntarily opened and the officers
entered and read the search warrant. After a search of the premises
some liquor was discovered. The defendant contended that the evidence
obtained by the search should be suppressed as the officers had entered
without demanding admission or informing the defendant or any one else
that they were officers of the law with a warrant for the search of the
house. The lower court admitted the evidence. Held: Judgment affirmed.
The evidence was admissible as the officers entered the apartment not as
trespassers but rather upon invitation. Worsdorfer v. State. Appellate
Court of Indiana, December 6, 1929, 169 N. E. 63.
If there was a license or invitation to enter here it was implied as
there was no express permission to enter given. The court held that the
voluntary opening of the door after the request for a glass of whisky constituted an implied invitation to enter.

